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THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: THE 
CASE OF BOTSWANA 
CHARLES MANGA FOMBAD* 
Abstract: This Article examines the doctrine of separation of powers and 
considers its relevance and significance in Mrican constitutional practice, 
in particular its operation in Botswana. The Article outlines the doctrine's 
origins, nature, purposes, and its major modern manifestations. The 
Article then analyzes the separation of powers in Botswana and considers 
how the doctrine's operation in Botswana has contributed to the country's 
solid and sustained constitutional system and its reputation as Mrica's 
most successful democracy. 
INTRODUCTION 
One important fundamental preoccupation of constitutionalism 
is the avoidance of governmental tyranny through the abuse of power 
by rulers pursuing their own interests at the expense of the life, lib-
erty, and property of the governed. A major challenge faced by consti-
tutional engineers has been to design a system of governance that 
maximizes the protection of individual members of society while 
minimizing the opportunities for governments to harm them. Of the 
theories of government that have attempted to provide a solution to 
this dilemma, the doctrine of separation of powers-in some respects, 
a fairly late addition to the body of organizational prescriptions-has 
been the most significant both intellectually and in terms of its 
influence upon institutional structures. Although it is a doctrine with 
a long history and respected pedigree, a careful perusal of the abun-
dant literature it has spawned shows that it is by no means a simple, 
immediately recognizable, or unambiguous set of concepts. In fact, 
modern scholars of the doctrine are not quite agreed on exactly what 
it means and its relevance to contemporary institutional development. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Uniyersity of Botswana. The author receiyed his Licence 
en droit at the Uniyersity of y"lOunde in Cameroon, and his L.L.l\I. and Ph.D. at the Uni-
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Nevertheless, in the last two decades, Mrican regimes caught in 
the wake of the so-called "third wave"l of democratization have tried 
to display their nascent democratic credentials by introducing new 
constitutions that apparently provide for a separation of powers.2 This 
is not surprising, for the French considered this doctrine so important 
that Article 16 of their Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of 1789 stated that any society in which the separation of pow-
ers is not observed "has no constitution."3 While many scholars, like 
the French, will go as far as identifYing the separation of powers with 
constitutionalism, many others, such as Geoffrey Marshall, feel that 
the doctrine is far too imprecise and incoherent to be useful in the 
analysis or critique of constitutions.4 
Since 1966, Botswana has had a constitution that appears to pro-
vide for a separation of powers.5 Botswana remains, by and large, M-
rica's most successful example of an open, transparent, and democratic 
1 See Charles Manga Fombad, Election Management Bodies in Africa: Cameroon's "National 
Elections Observatory" in Perspective, 3 AFR. HUM. R'rs. LJ. 25, 26 n.l (2003). Professor Sam-
uel Huntingdon coined the expression in SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DE-
MOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 1\vENTIETH CENTURY 21 (1991). Professor Huntingdon 
defines a "wave of democratization" simply as "a group of transitions from non-democratic 
to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly 
outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period." Id. at 15. He 
identifies two previous waves of democratization: a long, slow wave from 1828-1926, and a 
second wave from 1943-1962. Id. at 16. Most consider the "third wave" to have started in 
the 1970s, although it only reached African shores in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in 
what Professor Larry Diamond calls a "second liberation." L'lrry Diamond, Developing 
Democracy in Africa: African and International Perspectives, Presented at the Workshop 
on Democracy in Africa in Comparative Perspective, at Stanford University 2 (Apr. 27, 
2001), at http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/DiamondAfrica.htm; see also HUN-
TINGDON, supra, at 21; Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave OverT, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 20,20-21 
(1996) (discussing the third wave of democratization and the necessity of preventing a 
reverse wave). The "first liberation" in this respect was the grant of independence to Afri-
can countries in the early 1960s. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Introduction, in DEMOCRATIZA-
TION IN AFRICA, at ix, xxiv (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999). 
2 For a recent example of the meaning and implications of the separation of powers in 
the Cameroonian Constitution of January 18,1996, see Charles Manga Fombad, Cameroon, 
in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I, 33-34 (2003). 
3 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Aug. 26, 1789, art. 16 (Fr.), avail-
able at http://www.elyseeJr/ elyseel anglais/the_institutions/founding_texts/the_declaration 
_oCthe_humanJights/the_declaration_oCthe_human_rights.20240.html (last visited Apr. 
12, 2005) [hereinafter Declaration of the Rights of Man]. 
4 See GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 124 (1971). In fact, he con-
cludes that the doctrine is "infected with so much imprecision and inconsistency that it 
may be counted little more than a jumbled portmanteau of arguments for policies which 
ought to be supported or rejected on other grounds." Id. 
5 See BOTS. CONST. §§ 30-56 (on the executive); id. §§ 57-94 (on parliament); id. 
§§ 95-106 (on the judiciary). 
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government.6 Like many other African countries, however, it is marked 
by elements of personal government under an increasingly "imperial" 
president, who heads the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has 
monopolized power since independence.7 This has raised questions 
about whether the apparent separation of powers provided for in Bot-
swana's constitution is anything more than the hegemony of the execu-
tive over the other two branches of government. Is the doctrine of 
separation of powers a feature of the Botswana constitutional system, or 
it is merely an abstract philosophical inheritance that lacks both con-
tent and relevance to the realities of the country today? 
To answer this question, as well as to appreciate fully the operation 
of the doctrine in Botswana, this Article briefly traces the origins, evolu-
tion, and purposes of the doctrine of separation of powers, as well as its 
main modern manifestations. The Article argues that the doctrine can 
now be regarded as a general constitutional principle that was never 
conceived, nor intended, to operate as a rigid rule or dogma. Mindful 
of this significant fact, the Article analyzes the structure of government 
in Botswana and examines the exten t to which the doctrine operates 
within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. ""bat emerges 
from the analysis is that, despite the considerable scope for using the 
doctrine as a smokescreen for unconstitutional practices in Africa, Bot-
swana is an excellent example of a country where the doctrine has 
strengthened the pillars of constitutionalism and good governance. 
I. THE ORIGINS, NATURE, AND PURPOSES OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Debates have raged over the centuries about the origins of the 
doctrine of separation of powers. Some ideas about the doctrine can 
be found in the writings of many writers and thinkers of the medieval 
6 See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Introduction, ill 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
AFRICA 5 (L,rry Diamond et al. eds., 1988) (citing the Botswana government's repeated 
"free and fair elections" and toleration of "open dissent ... in a relatively liberal spirit"); 
Bureau of Mrican Mfairs, U.S. Department of St.,te, Background Note: Botswana (Mar. 
2005), at hup:/ /www.st..te.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm ("Botswana has a flourishing mul-
tiparty constitutional democracy."). 
7 See KENNETH GOOD, THE LIBERAL MODEL AND AFRICA: EUTES AGAINST DEMOCRACY 
14-15 (2002); Kenneth Good, Enduri1lg Elite De11locracy in Botswana, 6 DEMOCRATIZATION 
50,50-51 (1999); Sechele Teleka Sechele, Deepening Democracy or Creeping Authorit.,r-
ian Rule?: Media/Government Relations in Botswana in Historical Perspective (2000) 
(unpublished MPA dissertation, University of Botswana) (on file with author); see also John 
D. Holm, Botswana: A Paternalistic De11locmcy, in 2 DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
AFRICA, SIIpra note 6, at 179, 179 (discussing the BDP's role in Botswana). 
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period and middle ages in their search for the secrets of good gov-·· 
ernment. Plato's ideas of a "mixed state," set forth in The Republic, are 
considered by some to be the ancestors of the doctrine.8 Aristotle, 
while accepting Plato's idea of a mixed state as the only expedient way 
to ensure a stable and durable government, classed governmental 
functions into three categories: the deliberative, the magisterial, and 
the judicative.9 
The main controversy over the origins of the doctrine, however, 
centers on those who argue that John Locke and earlier writers are re-
sponsible for only the rudimentary and incomplete form of the doc-
trine, and that Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu lO 
created the normative theory of it as it is known today, as opposed to 
those who reject this two-pronged view." The view that curren tly enjoys 
broad support contends that, while the roots of the doctrine can be 
traced to numerous English writers and philosophers before John 
Locke, the latter is the author ofthe modern doctrine. Locke's concep-
tualization of the doctrine in his famous 1690 Second Treatise,12 came to 
be for his contemporaries and successive generations "the ABC of poli-
tics. "13 Likely influenced by the traditional twofold analysis of govern-
mental powers common to writings of that time, he advocated placing 
8 See GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 77 (4th ed. 1976). See generally 
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans., Vintage Classics 1991). 
9 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 68-73, 178-82 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books 
1962). This has led some writers to suggest that he originated the doctrine. See WILLIAM 
BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS 12 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1999) 
(1896); ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS 
PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 39 n.119 (1953) (citing others who believe that Aristotle 
originated the doctrine). 
10 See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 66, 69 (1965) [here-
inafter GWYN, SEPARATION OF POWERS}. Professor Gwyn quotes British translator Sir 
Ernest Barker, who writes in his translation of Otto Gierke's Natural Law and the Theory of 
Society that John Locke "simply seeks to distinguish, in thought, between the different func-
tions of political authority," and that he was "dealing with the logical analysis of functions, 
rather than with the practical question of separation (or union) of the organs which exer-
cise functions." Id. at 69. He also notes Edouard Fuzier-Herman's view that the "truly sci-
entific understanding" of the doctrine had a "completely French source," that is, Montes-
quieu. Id. at 66. 
II See, e.g., WILLIAM A. DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES: FROM LUTHER 
TO MONTESQUIEU 356 (1905) (describing Locke as treading "on new ground" in setting 
forth the doctrine of separation of powers); ].W. GOUGH, JOlIN LOCKE's POLITICAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 93 (1964) (citing Carl ErnstJarcke's assertion of Locke as the originator). 
12 See GWYN, SEPARATION Of' POWERS, supra note 10, at 66-81 (discussing Locke's sepa-
ration of powers); MJ.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 58-
67 (1967) (discussing Locke's separation of powers). 
13 GWYN, SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 10, at 69 (attributing the phrase to 'Val-
tel' Moyle, in his A.n Essay 011 the Lacedaemollian Government (1698». 
i 
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the "federative" and executive power in the hands of the same person, 
but apart from legislative power.14 Although Locke recognized the im-
portance of a neutral judiciary, he did not define an independent judi-
cial branch of government, and stopped short of what may be called 
the "pure" theory of separation of powers.15 
It is Montesquieu, however, who can be considered to have given 
the doctrine its modern scientific form, and whose ideas substantially 
influenced the French and American Revolutions. 16 Claiming to base 
his exposition on his understanding of the British constitution,17 he 
made two main contributions to the doctrine: he was the first to cate-
gorize governmental functions as legislative, the executive, and the 
judicial; and the first to analyze the relationship between the separa-
tion of powers and the balance of powers in terms of checks and bal-
ances.1S He believed that those possessing power will grasp for more 
powers unless checked by other power holders, and thus a separation 
of powers could only be maintained if accompanied by the system of 
checks and balances.19 Although Montesquieu was thus advocating 
what could be termed a "pure" form of separation of powers, as com-
pared to that of John Locke, it is quite clear from his theory of checks 
and balances that he was not advocating a rigid separation in which 
the different organs work in isolation from each other, but rather a 
system in which they were working "in concert" with each other.20 
14 See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 292-93 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 
rev. "with amends. 1970) (1690); VILE, mpra note 11, at 60. Locke saw "federative" power as 
a form of natural power over a state's international relations, thus he located international 
and domestic executive power in the same person. !d. Locke's "federative power" should 
be read as "executive power." VILE, supra note 11, at 86. Locke was quite emphatic that the 
legislative and executive powers must be placed in distinct hands if liberty were to be pre-
served. [d. at 6l. 
15 DAVID GWYNN MORGAN, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 4 
(1997). 
16 See BARON DE MONTF5QUlEU, 1 THE SPIRIT m" THE LAWS bk. XI, at 160-96 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., J.Y. Prichard ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1914); sec also GWYN, 
SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 10, at 100-28 (discussing Montesquieu and those fol-
lowing him); VILE, supra note 12, at 76-97 (discussing Montesquieu's doctrine of separa-
tion of powers). 
17 Sec MONTESQUIEU, supra note 16, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 162. This claim is now regarded as 
flawed, because the eighteenth-century English constitution did not observe the separa-
tion of powers in the form that he propounded. See Eric Barendt, Separation of POlUe1"S and 
Constitutional Government, 1995 PUB. L. (U.K.) 599,600. 
18 See generally MONTESQUIEU, supra note 16. 
19 Sec id. at 157-60. 
20 See GWYN, SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 10, at 110-12. 
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American independence provided a "high noon" in many respects 
for the development of the doctrine of separation of powers.21 It was ' 
natural that the American revolutionaries after their hard-earned inde-
pendence would not have the same trust in the legislature as the Eng-
lish did, nor would view the executive as somehow inferior or less rep-
resentative than the legislature. Influenced by writers such as John 
Adams and the authors of The Federalist Papers, described as "the great-
est work of American constitutionalism,"22 the nation's founders viewed 
the doctrine of separation of powers in its "pure" form as the best insti-
tutional structure of government.23 However, disagreements during the 
drafting of the federal constitution led to a compromise: the Constitu-
tion was to embody a moderate rather than a "pure" form of separation 
of powers, tempered by the idea of checks and balances.24 
The classic formulation of the doctrine of separation of powers in 
its "pure" form is based on the fundamental idea that there are three 
separate, distinct, and independent functions of government-the 
legislative, the executive, and the judicial-which should be dis-
charged by three separate and distinct organs-the legislature, the 
executive (or government), and the judiciary (or the courts).25 Thus 
formulated, the doctrine means at least three different things.26 
First, the same person should not belong to more than one of the 
three organs of government.27 This, for example, implies that cabinet 
ministers should not sit in parliament.28 Second, one organ of gov-
ernment should not usurp or encroach upon the powers or work of 
another.29 This means, for example, that the judiciary should be in-
21 See MORGAN, supra note 15, at 5. 
22 See William B. Gwyn, The Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of Democratic Govern-
ment, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DoES IT STIU WORK? 65, 66 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art 
Kaufman eds., 1986) [hereinafter Gwyn, Modern Forms]. See generally THE FEDERALIST (Ja-
cob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
23 See generally GWYN, SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 10, at 116-28 (noting Ameri-
can writings on separation of powers); VILE, supra note 12, at 119-75 (discussing separa-
tion of powers in America); Gerhard Casper, .4n Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early 
l0rsions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 212-24 (1989) (discussing separation of 
powers at time of the writing of the Constitution); Malcolm P. Sharp, The Classical American 
Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers, • 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 394-414 (1935) (describing 
founding fathers' thoughts on separation of powers). 
24 MORGAN, supra note 15, at 6. 
25 E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 50 
(2001). 
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dependent of the executive, and ministers should not be responsible 
to parliament,3o It also means that a person holding office in one or-
gan of government should not owe his tenure to the will or prefer-
ences of persons in any of the other organs. Thus, the continuation in 
office of ministers or members of parliament should depend on the 
will of the electorate at general elections. Third, one organ of gov-
ernment should not exercise the functions of another.31 For example, 
ministers should not exercise legislative powers.32 Although the doc-
trine has rarely been practiced in this extreme form, it does represent 
a sort of "bench-mark" or an "ideal-type" situation from which to ap-
preciate its present application today.33 
Five main reasons have historically been given for requiring that 
the legislative, executive, and judicial functions should not be exer-
cised by the same people: the rule of law, accountability, common in-
terest, efficiency, and balancing of interests.34 These rationales begin 
to illustrate why the doctrine of separation of powers has, in practice, 
emerged in different forms over the centuries. 
Under the "rule of law" version of the doctrine, those who make 
law should not also judge or punish violations of it, and vice versa. As 
the classic common law principle asserts, "no man shall be a judge in 
his own cause. "35 The rule of law rationale requires limits on executive 
discretion, but as Professor Joseph Raz has pointed out, it does not 
necessarily extinguish executive discretion, nor prevent lawmaking by 
the executive.36 For example, the executive may take discretionary 
action or make legal rules or orders, as long as they act within the lim-
its of the powers given to them by the law. 
The accountability rationale for the doctrine of separation of 
powers is closely linked to the rule of law. For example, if the legisla-
ture is to perform its function of calling delinquent government 
30 WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 53. 
31Id. 
32Id. 
33 See id. at 53 (stating that complete separation of powers is impossible). 
34 GWYN, SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 10, at 127-28; Gwyn, lIfodern Forms, supra 
note 22, at 68-70. Professor Gwyn proyides a full discussion of this issue in these two works, 
to which this account is indebted. 
35 This legal maxim is translated from the Latin phrase "nemo judex in causa sua." See 
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 22, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton) ("No man ought 
certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least 
in terest or bias."). 
36 See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its \'irtlle, in JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 
210,219 (1979). 
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officials to account, these officials should not dominate (or even be 
in) the legislature. Thus, they will not be judges in their own cases.37 
The "common interest" theory of the separation of powers was 
developed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in 
England to prevent factions or groups within parliament from pursu-
ing their own rather than the common interest. The separation of ex-
ecutive and legislative powers was thought to protect the common in-
terest, insofar as the legislature is more accountable to the people.38 
Today, however, the pursuit of private interests by different factions 
within parliamen t is not necessarily a bad thing, so long as it forms 
the basis of bargaining and compromises that reconcile the different 
interests. To this extent, the common interest version may still be 
valid, unless particular groups pursue and exercise greatly dispropor-
tionate influence that is prejudicial to the rest of society.39 
Governmental efficiency was one major reason for the develop-
ment of the doctrine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
efficiency rationale is based on the assumption that the different func-
tions of government require different qualities, and must therefore be 
performed by different organs.40 For example, the executive function 
was thought to require secrecy, expertise, and dispatch, but these char-
acteristics were not necessary to other organs of government. 41 Today, 
the efficiency argument no longer plays an influential role.42 
Finally, the "balancing of interests" version of the doctrine was 
influenced by the English theory of the mixed constitution, which 
gave the legislative powers jointly to the monarch, the House of 
Commons, and the House of Lords.43 Within this tripartite legislature, 
checks and balances were supposed to operate within the different 
groupS.44 For example, royal veto of legislation was seen as an execu-
tive check on the legislature, while the legislature by calling the ex-
ecutive to account and approving taxes, was able to place a check on 
the executive as well. Montesquieu formulated this balancing argu-
ment thus: 
37 See GWYN, SEPARATION OF POWERS, supm note 10, at 40-46, 60-61,77-78,126-27. 
38 Id. at 39-40, 45, 89. 
39 See gel/emily MARK HOLLINGSWORTH, MPs FOR HIRE: THE SECRET \VORLD OF POLITI-
CAL LOBBYING (1991) (discussing the pri\'atization of power in Britain). 
40 See GWYN, SEPARATION OF POWERS, supm note 10, at 28,31-35. 
41 See id. at 33, 37. 
42 See Sharp, supm note 23, at 397-413. 
43 See l\IORGAN, supm note 15, at 2-3. 
44 See id. 
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Here, then, is the fundamental constitution of the govern-
ment we are treating of. The legislative body being com-
posed of two parts, they check one another by the mutual 
privilege of rejecting. They are both restrained by the execu-
tive power, as the executive is by the legislative. These three 
powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction. 
But as there is a necessity for movement in the course of 
human affairs, they are forced to move, but still in concert.45 
309 
Political theorists and writers, from Plato and Aristotle to Locke, 
Montesquieu, John Adams, the American Federalists, and contempo-
rary writers were driven by one central purpose: the desire to avert 
t)Tanny. This prevention of tyranny through the diffusion of power is 
the common thread that unites the five different historical 
justifications for separating the legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions of government. This remains true even though some ra-
tionales, such as accountability and balancing of interests, are not al-
ways compatible with each other, and historical contexts and institu-
tional solutions have necessarily differed. Part II of this Article 
describes the three most influential models of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers that have emerged, and examines various manifesta-
tions of the effort to diffuse and divide power. 
II. THE MODERN MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The doctrine of separation of powers was never conceived as a 
rigid rule that completely prevents one organ of power from perform-
ing any of the functions normally performed by the other. In fact, 
Montesquieu, in advocating for a separation of the three functions of 
government using England as an example, could hardly have envi-
sioned absolute disjunction between the three functions, since this 
was certainly not the case in England at the time he wrote.46 
One political science professor has abstracted from historical ex-
perience a threefold classification into which modern governments 
that have adopted the doctrine can be classified. 47 The first is the 
American system, the model and prototype of presidential government, 
generally regarded as having gone farther than any other in embodying 
45 MONTISQUIEU, supra note 16, bk. XI, ch.6, at 162. 
46 See generally GWYN, SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 10 (indicating the mingling 
of the three branches in England at the time of Montesquieu 's writings). 
47 See Gwyn, Modern Forms, supra note 22, at 72-78. 
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the fundamentals of the doctrine of separation of powers.48 The second 
type is the British parliamen tary, or Westminster model, which appears 
to contradict the doctrine by fusing or concentrating powers.49 The 
third is the assembly or convention government that can be traced to 
England during the Interregnum50 and France in the 1870s, but was 
typical of the former Soviet Union and its allies until their collapse in 
the 1990s.51 It suffices to note here that the assembly government sys-
tem has generally been considered to reject the whole concept of sepa-
ration of powers.52 Within these three types lie numerous hybrids, 
prominent among them being the French Fifth Republic Constitution 
of 1958, which combines a parliamentary system with the element of a 
strong and elected president.53 Some salient features of the American 
presidential system, the British parliamentary system, and the French 
hybrid system are examined briefly below. 
A. The American Presidential System 
The doctrine of separation of powers is clearly expressed in the 
U.S. Constitution of 1787. Article I vests the legislative powers in Con-
gress, consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate; Arti-
cle II vests the executive powers in the president; and Article III con-
fers judicial powers in the Supreme Court and such other lower 
courts that may be established by Congress.54 The president is elected 
separately from Congress for a fixed term of four years and may 
therefore be from a different party from that possessing the majority 
in either or both Houses of Congress.55 He cannot however, use the 
threat of dissolution to compel Congress's cooperation. 
Notwithstanding the emphatic, and sometimes unqualified terms 
in which the doctrine of separation of powers is expressed in the U.S. 
Constitution, even a cursory examination of the relevant provisions 
48Id. at i3, i4. 
49 See id. at i5-i6. 
50 The Interregnum (1649-1660) was a period in which England was literally "between 
reigns," and as Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell ruled Britain as a republic; during this 
time, however, the type of government that would ultimately come to rule England and 
Scotland was indeterminate. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIA-
MENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 135-141 (1999) (describing the uncertainty of the Inter-
regnum). 
51 See Gwyn, j}Iodern Forms, supra note 22, at i6-i8. 
52Id. at i6. 
53JOlIN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14-20 (1992). 
54 U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. 
55 See id. at art. II, § 1. 
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reveals that the regime contemplated is far from a rigid separation of 
powers.56 This is manifested in several ways with respect to each of the 
three organs of power. 
As regards the executive, neither the president nor his officers 
may sit or vote in Congress.57 The vice president is the only member 
of the executive who, as president of the Senate, is empowered to vote 
when they are divided equally, and thus to exercise limited legislative 
power.58 The president cannot directly initiate bills, but he may rec-
ommend legislation to Congress.59 He can also exercise limited con-
trol over the legislative function through his right to veto legislation, 
although this can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in both Houses.6o 
The executive does, however, wield substantial regulatory and adjudi-
catory power pursuant to congressional delegations of authority to 
administrative agencies.61 The president also exercises control over 
the judiciary through his power to grant reprieves and pardons for 
federal offenses, and more importantly, to nominate federaljudges. 62 
With respect to the legislative power, Congress controls the ex-
ecutive's exercise oflegislative powers to amend or repeal statutes that 
authorize executive agencies. Congress controls the budget and con-
ducts oversight hearings.63 The Senate checks the executive further 
through its right to approve treaties negotiated by the president, as 
well as its right to approve appointments by the president of ambassa-
dors, judges, and other senior officers.64 Each House has the right to 
punish its own members for contempt and thus exercises some form 
of judicial power.65 The Senate is allocated additional judicial powers, 
possessing the sole power to try impeachments.66 In addition to these 
internal judicial powers, the Congress has the power to create and 
regulate the lower federal courts.67 
Regarding the judicial power, although the judiciary has not 
been allocated specific or general supervisory powers over the execu-
56 [d. a tarts. II, III. 
57 Sec id. at art. I, § 6, d. 2. Similarly, a judge cannot serve simultaneously in Congress 
and as an executive. Sec id. 
58 U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 3, d. 4. 
59 Sec id. at art. II, § 3. 
60 [d. at art. I, § 7, d. 2. 
61 Sec BONDY, supra note 9, at 145-48. 
62 U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 2, ds. 1, 2. 
63 Sec id. at art. I, § 8, d. 1, § 9, d. 7. 
64 See id. at art. II, § 2, d. 2. 
65 Sec id. at art I, § 5. 
66 Sec id. at art. I, § 3, d. 6. 
67 U.S. CON ST. art. III, § l. 
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tive, it may use its general equitable jurisdiction to issue writs of man-
damus against executive officers to ensure that they perform their 
constitutional duties.68 Perhaps the most important judicial check on 
executive action is the authority to enforce compliance with the con-
stitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights, which include 
the rights to due process of law, freedom of speech, and the right to a 
jury tria1.69 The judiciary also controls legislative action through its 
power to declare statutes unconstitutionaPO As in Britain and Bot-
swana, discussed below, the common law doctrine of judicial prece-
dent, or stare decisis, enables the judiciary to set precedents that have 
a quasi-legislative effect. Outside the constitutional arena, however, 
congressional action can nullifY judge-made law. 
In this way, the American presidential system, instead of isolating 
each organ from the other two, provides for an elaborate system of 
checks and balances. In the words of James Madison, in The Federalist: 
From these facts by which Montesquieu was guided it may 
clearly be inferred, that in saying "there can be no liberty 
where the legislative and executive powers are united in the 
same person, or body of magistrates" or "if the power of 
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive 
powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to 
have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each 
other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more 
conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can 
amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of 
one department is exercised by the same hands which pos-
sess the whole power of another department, the fundamen-
tal principles of a free constitution are subverted.71 
This is based on the "open recognition that particular functions be-
long primarily to a given organ while at the same time superimposing 
a power of limited interference by another organ in order to ensure 
that the former does not exercise its acknowledged functions in an 
arbitrary and despotic manner."72 
68 See id. at art. III (specifying no powers of the judiciary oyer the executive). 
69 Seeid. amends. I, V, VI; Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-80 (1803). 
70 See the famousjudgment of Chief Justice Marshall in Marlmry. See 5 U.S. at 180. 
71 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 22, at 325-26 (James Madison). 
72 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TEXTBOOK 18 (Jane Blessley ed., 1990) [hereinafter CON-
STITUTIONAL LAwl. 
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B. The Blitish Parliamentary System 
The same three fundamental governmental powers exist in Brit-
ain, just as they do in the United States. However, the extensive fusion 
and overlapping between the authorities in which the powers are vested 
has led many to question whether the doctrine of separation of powers 
is really a feature of the British constitutional system.73 Because of this 
fusion or concentration of legislative and executive powers, there is no 
strict separation of powers in Britain on the scale provided for in the 
U.S. Constitution. However, the impact of the doctrine of separation of 
powers on the British constitutional system can be seen from three per-
spectives. 
The first examines the relationship between the legislature and 
the executive. The Queen, the nominal head of the executive, is an 
integral part of parliament, as is the Prime minister.74 Ministers, also 
part of the executive, must by convention be members of one of the 
two Houses of Parliament.75 The parliament controls the executive by 
its power to oust a government by withdrawing parliamentary sup-
port. 76 Other forms of parliamentary control over the executive in-
clude question time, select committees, adjournment debates, and 
opposition days.77 The executive may also exercise considerable legis-
73 See id. at 14. For example, Stanley de Smith, a scholar of constitutional law, asserts 
that "no writer of repute would claim that it is a central feature of the modern British sys-
tem of government." [d. The weight of opinion today favors the contrary view. According 
to the British judge Lord Diplock, "it cannot be too strongly emphasi[z] ed that the British 
constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly based upon the separation of powers .... " 
Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142, 157. 
74 See A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 253-
54,260-61,274-80 (12th ed. 1997); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 14. This type 
of executive is referred to as "two-headed." 
75 See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 74, at 185. The House of Commons Dis-
qualification Act limits the number of ministers who may sit in the House of Commons to 
ninety-five, which is about fifteen percent of the total number of members of Parliament. 
See House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1975, ch. 24, § 2 (Eug.); BRADLEY & EWING, 
supra note 74, at 185. 
76 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 14. 
77 [d. at 15. Modern scholars characterize question time, in which members of parlia-
ment question the prime minister on controversial issues, as "resembl[ing] presidential 
press conferences." Sir David Williams, The Courts and Legislation: Anglo-American Con-
trasts, Lecture in Accordance with the George P. Smith, II, Distinguished Visiting Profes-
sorship-Chair of Law and Legal Research Endowment (Apr. 12, 2000), in 8 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 2001, at 323, 335; see Douglas W. Vick, Anglicizing Defamation Law in 
the European Union, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 965 (1996). Select committees are committees of 
backbench members of parliament (party members without official government positions) 
designated to investigate policy or administrative issues and produce detailed reports. See 
generally House of Commons Information Office, United Kingdom Government, Factsheet 
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lative functions through the making of statutory instruments, based 
on powers vested on it by parliamentary acts and the power to dissolve 
the House of Commons. 78 
The second perspective considers the relationship between the 
executive and the judiciary, and reveals an absence of a strict separation 
between the two. For example, as head of the judiciary, the Lord Chan-
cellor is entitled to preside over the House of Lords when the latter is 
sitting as a court, and is also a member of the cabinet.79 As a member of 
the House of Lords, he also belongs to the legislature, and is thus effec-
tively part of all three powers.80 The executive exercises some control 
over the judiciary through the appointment of its members.8) The 
courts do exercise, however, considerable control over the executive by 
protecting citizens against unlawful acts of government agencies and 
officials, and, if proper application is made, by an aggrieved citizen, by 
reviewing executive acts for conformity with the law.82 
Finally, the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature 
also manifests some of the features of an admixture of functions that 
is typical of the British parliamentary system. As noted above, the 
Lord Chancellor heads the judiciary, is a member of the House of 
P2: Departmental Select Committees (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.parIiament.uk/ 
documents/upload/p02.pdf. Adjournment debates are initiated by backbench members 
to raise issues related to his or her constituency or to matters of public concern. See United 
Kingdom Government, The Accou ntability of Gove1'1lment: Backbenc11 and Opposition Opportuni-
ties ill the Commons, at http://www.parIiament.uk/works/account.cfm (last updated July 6, 
2004). Opposition days are days allocated specifically to allow members of an opposition 
(non-m~ority) party to voice concerns. See Opposition Days, BBC NEWS, Mar. 8, 2000, at 
http:// news. bbc.co. uk/ 1 /hi/ uk_politics/ a-z_ oCparIiamen t/ m-o / 82595.stm. 
78 See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 74, at 94. 
79 [d. 
80 See id.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 15. 
81 See id. For example, Magistrates and Circuit Judges are appointed by the Lord Chan-
cellor; High Court Judges are appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Lord Chancel-
lor; and Lords Justice of Appeal and Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are appointed by the 
Queen on the advice of the prime minister after consulting the Lord Chancellor. CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 15. They are protected, however, from arbitrary executive 
action in many ways. See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 74, at 94. For example, superior 
judges continue to hold office for the duration of their "good behavior," and can only be 
removed by the Queen if both houses of parliament issue such an address to her. CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 15. The Act of Settlement of 1701 guarantees the 
financial independence of the judiciary by making their salaries "ascertained and estab-
lished," meaning that their salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund, which perma-
nently authorizes their payment. Act of Settlement (june 12, 1701) (Eng.); CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 15. 
82 See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 74, at 94-95; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 
72, at 15. 
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Lords, and presides over it when it sits as a legislative body.83 Although 
parliament may control the judiciary by way of legislation affecting 
the judiciary, the fact that judicial salaries are authorized permanently 
deprives parliament of an important opportunity to annually review 
and possibly criticize judges.84 Though the judiciary and the legisla-
ture generally do not exercise each other's functions, and the doc-
trine of legislative supremacy denies courts the power to review the 
constitutional validity of legislation, judges do exercise some lawmak-
ing function in the process of interpreting and applying the law.85 But 
the effect of any court decision may be altered by parliament both 
prospectively and retrospectively.86 In addition, "[b]ecause of the 
[common law] doctrine of judicial precedent, the judicial function of 
declaring and applying the law has a quasi-legislative effect. "87 
Absent a written constitution, there is no formal separation of 
powers in Britain. Because of the close relationship between the legis-
lative and the executive, there is no strict separation of powers be-
tween the two. Nevertheless, the legislative and executive function 
remain clearly distinct. The judiciary is also effectively separated from 
the other two, with the exception of the Lord Chancellor and the Law 
Lords, who may participate in the legislative debates of the House of 
Lords.88 One scholar has even argued that the doctrine of separation 
of powers in Britain means nothing more than an independent judi-
ciary.89 The crux of the British conception of the doctrine, however, is 
that parliament, the executive, and the judiciary each have "their dis-
tinct and largely exclusive domain," and the circumstances where one 
83 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 16. It is worth noting that, except under 
certain circumstances specified in the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, a bill may be 
presented for royal assent to become law only after both the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords have approved it. BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 74, at 207. The House of 
Lords, therefore, plays a very important role in the lawmaking process in Britain. For a 
comparative perspective, see S.E. FINER ET AI.., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 59--64 (1995). 
84 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 16; see also BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 
74, at 59--64 (discussing legislative controls on the judiciary). 
85 See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 74, at 96. 
86 ld. at 96. 
87 ld. at 97. 
88 See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 15-16. 
89 ld. at 18. In fact, Professor Reginald Parker has argued that effective separation of 
powers in England dates from the passage of a statute making judges removable from 
office only through impeachment by parliament for misconduct. See Reginald Parker, The 
Historic Basis of Admi1listrative Law: Separati01l of POWc'fS and Judicial Supremacy, 12 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 449, 450, 457 (1958). 
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exercises the functions of the other are the exception and dictated by 
practical necessity.9o 
C. The French Hyblid 
The United States' approach to the doctrine of separation of 
powers is, as we have seen, largely derived from the work of Montes-
quieu, a French intellectual. The doctrine has firm roots in French 
constitutional tradition, exemplified by the bold assertion in Article 
16 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
that a society with no separation of powers is like one with no consti-
tution at al1.91 The doctrine is enshrined in the current 1958 constitu-
tion of the Fifth French Republic.92 However, the French understand-
ing and application of the doctrine is markedly different from both 
the U.S. and British models. It is essentially a parliamentary system 
that provides for close cooperation between the executive and the 
legislature, rather than a strict separation of powers. It contains ele-
ments of parliamentarianism, such as a two-headed executive, the col-
lective political responsibility of government to parliament, and the 
right of government to dissolve the lower chamber of parliament.93 
But the president of the republic plays a role that is hardly typical of a 
parliamentary regime. Several peculiarities of this system of separa-
tion of powers are notable. 
Perhaps one of the most distinctive features of the French system 
is the position of the judiciary. Because of the poor reputation of 
royal courts (Parlements) before the French revolution, one of the 
first steps taken by the revolutionaries was to break the powers of 
these Parlements.94 This was done by the famous Law of 16-24 August 
90 See R. v. Sec 'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2 All E.R. 244, 267 (1995). 
91 See Declaration of the Rights of Man, supra note 3, at art. 16. 
92 See generally FR. CaNST. 
93 See id. at art. 8 (declaring the power of the president to appoint and dismiss the 
prime minister); id. at art. 12 (declaring the power to dissolve parliament); id. at arts. 34-
40 (describing the limited legislative powers of parliament). The executive is controlled by 
the president of the republic, who appoints the prime minister from among the members 
of the national assembly (assembly). See id. at art. 8. The parliament is composed of the 
senate and the assembly, but in practice, the executive wields the most power. See id. at art. 
24 (parliament consists of assembly and senate). 
94 See john Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. CaMP. L. 109, 109-10 
(1996). The obsessive fear of legal dictatorship through a "Government by judges" was so 
strong that French judges are only required, in Montesquieu's words, to act as "Ia bouche 
qui prononce les paroles de la loi" [the mouth that pronounces the law]. ld. at 111-12. 
Stanford University law professor john Merryman describes the background of the present 
court system and the Parlements, and points out that the French legal system-in its pure 
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1790,95 inspired in part by Montesquieu's conception of the separa-
tion of powers.96 This law precludes ordinary courts from interfering 
with the work of government; an ordinary citizen aggrieved by some 
government action can seek a remedy only before the administrative 
courts, which exercise limited judicial, administrative (executive), and 
legislative functions. Perhaps the most serious effect of the somewhat 
obsessive French distrust of judges is that the limited control of the 
constitutionality of laws that does exist is exercised, not by a judicial, 
but rather a quasi-administrative body, the Constitutional Council 
(Conseil constitutionnel) .97 
Another unique feature of the French incorporation of the doc-
trine is that, instead of defining the areas in which the executive is 
empowered to promulgate regulations on its own initiative, it defines 
only the parliament's field of legislative competence. Outside this 
field, defined in article 34 of the constitution, the executive enjoys the 
competence to legislate on all other matters.98 Thus, residuary legisla-
tive power lies not with the parliament, as it does in other countries, 
but with the executive.99 
Article 64 of the constitution provides that the president of the 
republic is the guardian of the judiciary's independence.1oo This 
clearly suggests that the courts are not on the same level as the execu-
form, a deviant from the European "jus commune" [common law]-is now returning to 
the European mainstream. See id. at 118. 
95 Law of Aug. 16-24, 1790, tit. II (Fr.). 
96 See Stephan Riesengeld, The French System ofA.dministrativejustice: A ModclforAmcncan 
Law, 18 B.U. L. REv. 48, 56-58 (1938). Article 13 of the 1790 law, still in force today, states 
that "judicial functions are and will remain forever separate from the administrative func-
tions. The judges will not be allowed, under penalty of forfeiture, to disturb in any manner 
whatsoever, the activities of the administrative corps, nor to summon before them the ad-
ministrators, concerning their functions." HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
284 (7th ed. 1998) (quoting Riesengeld, supra, at 58); sec also L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. 
BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 46 (5th ed. 1998). 
97 See genemlly Michael H. Davis, The Law/Politics Distinction, tlte French COllseil Constitu-
tionncl, and the U.S. Supreme Court, 34 AM.]. CaMP. L. 45, 45-92 (1986) (discussing the Con-
seil constitutionnel's nature as a court and comparing it to the U.S. Supreme Court); 
Charles Manga Fombad, The New Cameroonian Constitutional Council in a Compamtive Perspec-
tive: Progress or Retrogression?, 42]. AFR. L. 172, 172-86 (1998) (offering an African perspec-
tive); Fran~ois Luchaire, Le Conseil Constitutionllcl est-illlne juridiction?, REVUE DE DROIT 
PUBLIC 30, 30-43 (1979) (offering a French perspective). 
98 See FR. CaNST. arts. 34, 37. 
99 This residual power is exercised effectively by the prime minister, who has the right 
under article 39 of the constitu tion to introduce bills on behalf of the govern men t to par-
liament. See id. at art. 39. Although members of parliament can also introduce bills, this is 
the exception rather than the rule. See id. 
100 Id. at art. 64. 
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tive, but rather below. Article 65 reinforces this supposition by making 
the president of the republic the head of the High Council of the Ju-
diciary, the body responsible for recommending judicial appoint-
ments and enforcing judicial discipline. lol This French deviation has 
been explained convincingly by the suggestion that the 1958 constitu-
tion did not envisage the French president as an executive officer, but 
rather as a person outside the classic tripartite division of legislative, 
executive, and judiciary. 102 The overall effect, however, is the grant of 
greater control of the judiciary by the executive than in the American 
or British models. 
With the judiciary largely subordinate to the executive, the doc-
trine of separation of powers in France thus means little more than 
distinguishing between the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment. As a form of parliamentary democracy, this system allows 
close collaboration between the executive and legislative powers 
rather than a strict separation between the two, and skews the balance 
of power toward the executive. 
III. THE OPERATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION 
OF POWERS IN BOTSWANA 
African constitutional systems have borrowed extensively from 
the leading Western constitutional models discussed above. What is 
remarkable is the extent to which these borrowed models have been 
adjusted and adapted to the conditions unique to each country. Thus, 
few African nations have adopted the U.S. presidential, the Westmin-
ster parliamentary, or the French semi-presidential and semi-
parliamentary model in their respective entireties. 
The constitution of Botswana implicitly recognizes the separation 
of powers by dealing with each organ of government in separate and 
101 ld. at art. 65. The appointment of the nine members of the Conseil constitutionnel 
is divided equally among the president, the assembly, and the senate. ld. at art. 56. 
102 See JOHN A. ROHR, FOUNDING RHUBLICS IN FRANCE AND AMERICA: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 89-92 (1995). Article 5 of the constitution supports this 
statement, giying the president the power to ensure that the constitution is respected and 
requiring him to "ensure, by his arbitration," the regular functioning of goyernmental 
authorities as well as the continuance of the state. See FR. CON ST. art. 5. The president must 
also serye as the guarantor of national independence, the integrity of the territory, and 
respect for community agreements and treaties. ld. To guarantee national independence, 
article 16 grants the president virtually unfettered power to act decisively on his own initia-
tiYe at times of great peril. See id. at art. 16. To emphasize the president's "imperial role,· 
article 68 removes presidential accountability for official actions except in the case of high 
treason. See id. at art. 68. 
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distinct provisions.lo3 Like the French system, the Botswana model 
mixes the British parliamentary system with elements of the U.S. presi-
dential system, but is much more similar to the British model with a 
number of unique features of its own. For example, the president is not 
elected by direct popular vote, as is done in France.104 Analysis of the 
operation of the doctrine shows that, like in Britain, it mixes executive 
and legislative power and provides for the relative independence of the 
judicial power, although in quite dissimilar aspects. 
A. The Mixing of Executive and Legislative Powers 
The executive is easily the most important of the three branches 
of government, functioning chiefly to execute or carry out state func-
tions. As the engine of the political system, its power has always re-
quired a check. One of the major reasons for Africa's dismal record 
on constitutionalism is the ease with which African leaders have man-
aged to adopt imperial tendencies, enabling them to rule largely 
without legislative or judicial interference.105 In spite of the existence 
of written constitutions, insufficient governmental accountability led 
to the inability to prevent abuses of power. In a constitutional dispen-
sation of power based on a philosophy of constitutionalism and sepa-
ration of powers, an effective system must not only define and limit 
executive powers, but also ensure that the executive operates within 
these bounds. This requires a judicious balance that grants the execu-
tive sufficient powers to discharge its mandate without overly inhibi-
tive and paralyzing restrictions. In Botswana, the mixing of executive 
and legislative functions is integral to the process of providing checks 
and balances. Although this mixing has, at times, led to the same per-
sons forming part of the executive and legislative branches, the system 
also contains mechanisms by which the two branches can control and 
thus check each other. 
103 See BOTS. CON ST. §§ 30-56 (executive); id. §§ 57-94 (legislature); id. §§ 95-107 (ju-
diciarv). 
104 See id. §§ 32-34; FR. CONST. art. 6. The president is chosen from and elected by 
members of Parliament. BOTS. CONST. § 32. 
105 See generally The Evolving lifrican Constitutionalism: Special Issue, 60 REV. INT'I. COM-
MISSION m'juRIsTS (1998) (devoting the volume to the evolution of African Constitution-
alism); Charles M. Fombad, Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms in Africa: A Preliminary 
Assessment of the Prospects for Constitutional Governance and Constitutionalism, Pre-
sented at the Organization of Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa 
Conference on African Conflicts (Nov, 29-Dec. 1, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
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1. The Same Persons Forming Part of the Executive and Legislative 
Branches 
A number of persons form part of both the legislative and execu-
tive branches. On the one hand, the state president (president) is 
vested with "the executive power of Botswana. "106 On the other hand, 
the president is also an ex officio member of parliament, with the 
power to speak and vote in all parliamentary proceedings.107 Other 
principal officers of the executive, consisting of the vice president, 
ministers, and assistant ministers, are appointed by the president and 
are members of parliament.10B Although the president may appoint 
the vice president and up to four ministers and assistant ministers 
from persons who are not MPs, such persons must qualify for and 
seek election to parliament.109 If they fail to gain a parliamentary seat 
within four months of their appointment, they cease to hold executive 
office.110 As "principal legal adviser to the Government of Bot-
swana, "lll the Attorney General is responsible for conducting prose-
cutions on the state's behalf,ll2 and is also an ex officio member of 
parliament. ll3 In effect, the president and ministers who are the chief 
executive officials are also members of the legislative branch. To avoid 
undue bureaucratic influence, however, civil servants and other sala-
ried public employees must resign their offices before assuming a seat 
in parliament.1l4 
The dominant position of the executive vis-a.-vis the legislature is 
underscored by many members of parliament who are members of 
the executive as well. The constitution provides for sixty-onell5 mem-
106 HOTS. CONST. §§ 30, 47(1). The president is considered the head of state. [d. § 30. 
107 [d. §§ 57, 58(1). 
108 See id. § 39(1) (addressing the vice president's appointment); id. § 42(3) (address-
ing the appointments of ministers and assistant ministers). 
\09 [d. §§ 39(1), 42, 43. 
110 [d. § 43. 
111 HOTS. CONST. § 51(2). 
112 [d. § 51 (3) (a). Although the prosecutorial function is ·conceptually closer to the 
judicial power in that it is quasijudicial in nature," it is generally regarded as a part of the 
functions of the executive. See MORGAN, supra note 15, at 163-64, 267. 
\13 HOTS. CON ST. § 58(1). 
114 Seeid. § 62(e). 
115 Constitution (Amendment) Act of 2002, No. 12 of 2002 (Hots.) (amending § 58 of 
the constitution). Section 58 of the amended constitution provides for sixty-one members 
of parliament, consisting of fifty-seven elected members and four specially appointed 
members. HOTS. CON ST. § 58. The president appoints the specially appointed members, 
following a procedure laid out in a schedule to the constitution. [d. § 58(2)(b). Although 
parliament consists of the assembly and a house of chiefs, the latter has no legislative 
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bers of parliament.116 With a total of eighteen ministers and assistant 
ministers,1I7 the executive constitutes nearly one-third of the members 
of parliament. The principle of collective responsibility118 ensures that 
any motion119 presented by the government will receive at least eight-
een favorable votes.120 Given its dominance, the present government 
rarely loses a vote and effectively controls the legislature. Unlike Brit-
ain, no statutory limits exist to restrict the number of ministers com-
ing from parliament.121 The chief drawback of this is that on a num-
ber of occasions, parliamentary sessions have had to be adjourned 
due to the absence of ministers who had gone out on official en-
gagemen tS.122 
The extent of executive influence over the legislative branch is 
particularly evident in the lawmaking process. Although the parlia-
ment's principal function to make laws, as in most parliamentary de-
mocracies, the whole of this process-especially the most decisive pre-
legislative stages-is controlled and driven completely by the execu-
tive.1 23 Direct parliamentary participation in the lawmaking process is 
limited at best to the virtually ineffective exercise of introducing pri-
vate member's bills, or at later stages, amending a government bill-
power and functions primarily as an advisory body with special purview over tribal and 
customary law matters. See id. §§ 57, 77, 85. 
116 See BOTS. CONST. § 58. This excludes the Attorney General, who is an ex officio 
member of parliament, but has no vote. See id. 
117 There are fourteen ministers and four assistant ministers. 
liS The principle of collective responsibility is stated formally in section 50(1) of the 
constitution. D.D. NTANDA NSEREKO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN BOTSWANA 96 (2002). Pur-
suant to this principle, cabinet members are jointly accountable to the assembly and public 
at large for government policies and decisions. Id. They are also jointly answerable for 
their colleagues' official actions and for the legal implementation of those decisions or 
policies. See id. 
119 A motion is a formal proposal put before parliament for a Yote, and is a measure 
used to increase government accountability. See NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 183. 
120 "Backbench" members of parliament are supporters of the ruling party who are 
members of parliament, but do not hold executive office and are not officially part of the 
government. See NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 66 ("Backbench MPs are potential Cabinet 
members. They would be careful to not to jeopardize their chances of being appointed to 
Cabinet posts by being overly critical of the Executive."). 
121 See discussion supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
122 Under section 73 of the constitution, if less than one-third of the members of the 
assembly are present at any session, then the presiding member may adjourn the session. 
BOTS. CONST. § 73. Although it is not required that more than a third of members always 
be present, if fewer are present, and any member draws attention to that fact, then the 
session must be adjourned. See Bopa Reporters, Live Parliamentary Proceedings on TI' Will Be 
Costly, DAILY NEWS (Bots.), Nov. 5, 2003, at 2. 
123 See generally Charles Manga Fombad, S01l/e Insights into Statutory Lawmaking in Bot-
swana, 27 J. FORJURID. SCI. (S. Afr.) 70-78 (2002). 
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but this rarely affects the content or fundamental principles of the 
bill. Bills only become law with the assent of the president.124 In the 
unlikely event that the president withholds assent, the bill is returned 
to parliament, who must resubmit it within six months.125 When the 
bill is returned, the president has twenty-one days within which to as-
sent, or failing this, automatically dissolve parliament and call fresh 
elections.126 Thus, the possibility of a president refusing to assent to a 
bill is quite remote. Almost all bills are discussed in cabinet meetings 
chaired by the president, and are typically presented in parliament by 
a cabinet member, who, along with the whips,127 ensures the bill goes 
through without significant modifications. Because of the executive's 
ability to ensure that desired legislation is passed, it is fair to conclude 
that, to all intents and purposes, the executive controls parliament. 
2. The Executive Exercise of Legislative Functions 
The principal area in which the Botswana executive performs the 
functions normally reserved for the legislature is in the making of leg-
islation in the form of delegated or subsidiary legislation, or statutory 
instruments.128 Although section 86 of the constitution empowers par-
liament to "make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
Botswana,"129 over the years, it has entrusted the exercise of limited 
legislative powers to certain persons and subordinate bodies within 
the executive for various reasons. In fact, the bulk of subsidiary legis-
lation today far exceeds legislation enacted by parliament in the form 
of parliamen tary acts.130 
124 BOTS. CONST. § 87. 
125Id. § 87(4). 
126Id. 
127 As are whips in British parliament, whips in the Botswana government are members 
of parliament responsible for ensuring that party members vote as the m~ority desires. See, 
e.g., Lisa E. Klein, On the Brink of Reform: Political Party Funding in Britain, 31 CASE W. RES.]. 
INT'L L. I, 8-9 (1999) ("Parliamentary discipline is reinforced by the political parties' 
Whips, who serve as links between the party leadership and the ordinary Members of Par-
liament. The ''''hips are influential in advancing the career of back-benchers and may 
bring their influence to bear in persuading Members to support the leadership's position 
... ."). 
128 Subsidiary legislation in Botswana may take the form of proclamations, regulations, 
rules, rules of court, orders, bylaws, or any other instrument made directly or indirectly 
under any enactment and having legislative effect. Sec Interpretation Act, Cap. 01 :04, § 49 
(1984) (Bots.). 
129 Id. § 86. 
130 Sec generally 84 BOTSWANA STATUTE LAW 2000 (Botswana Government Printer). This 
volume published all legislation made in 2000. It contains only fourteen acts of parlia-
ment, but includes eighty statutory instruments or subsidiary legislation. 
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Delegated legislation is an inevitable feature of modern govern-
ments for several reasons. First, the complex and protracted nature of 
the lawmaking process131 and the pressure upon parliamentary time 
would cause the legislative machinery to break down if parliament 
attempted to enact every piece of legislation by itself. Second, legisla-
tion on certain technical topics necessitates prior consultations with 
experts and stakeholders. Granting some legislative powers to minis-
ters and other select bodies facilitates this consultation. Third, in en-
acting legislation, the parliament cannot foresee every administrative 
or other difficulty that may arise, nor is parliamentary recourse feasi-
ble each time amendments to acts become necessary.132 Finally, in 
emergencies, the government must be able to act promptly and effec-
tively outside its usual powers without resorting to parliament. 133 
Although there is general agreement over the necessity of dele-
gated legislation, real problems arise in reconciling it with the process 
of democratic consultations, scrutiny and control, which normal bills 
are subjected to before becoming law. Possible abuses of the powers of 
delegated legislation in Botswana are checked and controlled in three 
main ways. The first type of control is exercised before delegated leg-
islation is published and comes into effect. For example, the Statutory 
Instruments Act of 1984 requires all statutory instruments to be 
printed and published in the Government Gazette before they come into 
force. 134 This Act also states that bylaws, usually made by local authori-
ties, must be submitted to the Minister for approval before publica-
tion in the Gazette. 135 The second type of control is exercised by the 
parliament. According to the Statutory Instruments Act, all statutory 
instruments must be presented to parliament after they are written, 
131 See generally Fombad, SUp1¥! note 123. 
132 For example, section 11 (2) of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund Act of 1998 allows 
the minister to adjust the compulsory fuel levy as he sees fit rather than resorting to the 
parliament for the complicated process of amending the act to achieve this purpose. Mo-
tor Vehicle Accident Fund Act of 1998, § 11 (2) (Bots.). 
133 See BOTS. CON ST. § 17. 
134 Statutory Instruments Act, Cap. 01:04, § 3(1) (1984) (Bots.). The United States' 
analog is the Administrative Procedures Act; it requires, among other provisions, the pub-
lication of rules in the Federal Register and for congressional rejection of major rules. 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2005). 
135 Statutory Instruments Act § 30. The Govermnent Gazette is published weekly by the 
Botswana Government Printer, and is the government's chief means of disseminating law-
making and other policy-related information to the public. See Ministry of State President, 
Government of Bots\\'ana, Government Plinting and Publishing, at http://www.gov.bw/gov-
ernment/ministry_oCstate_president.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005); see also NSEREKO, 
SUp1¥! note 118, at 176. 
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and the parliament may pass a resolution within twenty-one days nulli-
fying any of them. 136 In practice, however, this rarely happens, be-
cause these statutory instruments are rarely placed before the parlia-
ment. Furthermore, even when they are, members of parliament 
often do not have the time to examine them critically. 
The third, and perhaps most effective method of controlling sub-
sidiary lawmaking, is based on common law and exercised by way of 
judicial review. Individuals against whom a statutory instrument is be-
ing enforced may challenge its validity before the courts-even when 
the parliament has approved the legislation-if it is ultra vires or if 
the correct procedure was not followed in making it. Thus, in Bot-
swana Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund v. Marobela, the Court of Appeal de-
clared section 7(1) (a)(iv) of the Motor Vehicle Fund Regulations, 
created by the Minister, null and void for its inconsistency with the 
spirit and intent of the parent Act, the Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund 
Act of 1986.137 The court made it clear that a regulatory authority 
could not "reduce, qualify, or diminish the rights conferred" by the 
parent statute. 138 In Maauwe & Another v. Attorney-General, regulation 
75(1) of the Prisons' Regulation, to the extent that it prevented con-
demned prisoners from consulting with their legal representatives out 
of the hearing of prison officers, was considered unreasonable, be-
yond the scope of the provisions of the Prisons Act, and thus of no 
force and effect. 139 
Generally, as in Marobela, where the statutory instrument is 
deemed only partially illegal, the courts may sever the lawful from the 
unlawful part and leave the instrument operational,14o If this is impos-
sible, the entire instrument may be declared invalid. But whatever the 
approach, the end result is that the courts may prevent the executive 
from abusing the wide-ranging power to make subsidiary legislation. 
136 Statutory Instruments Act § 9. 
137 [1999] B.L.R. 21. 29-30; see Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund Act (Act No. 30 of 1986) 
(Bots.). 
138 See Marobela, 1 B.L.R. at 29-30. 
139 After a second trial and the aid of advocates from Ditshwanelo. the Botswana Cen-
tre for Human Rights. the two men were acquitted of murder and released on March 21. 
2005. Press Release: Maauwe & Motswetla Acquitted and Discharged. Ditshwanelo-Bot-
swana Centre for Human Rights (Mar. 22. 2005). available at http://www.ditshwanelo. 
org. bw / index/ Curren t_Issues/Death _Penal ty /Maauwe% 20Motswetla %20%2022%20March 
%202005.htm. 
140 See. e.g .• Marobela. 1 B.L.R. at 29-30. 
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3. The Legislative Control Over the Executive 
Despite the executive's apparently dominant position, legislative 
control of the activities of the executive is the crux of the parliamen-
tary system that Botswana has implemented. Although obscurely 
worded, section 50(1) of the constitution states that the cabinet shall 
be responsible to parliament "for all things done by or under the 
authority of the president, vice president or any minister in the execu-
tion of his office."141 The requirement that all ministers be members 
of parliamen t is justified most often by the principle that the ministers 
are responsible collectively to parliament.142 This allows parliament to 
control the conduct of cabinet members, and to check abuses of 
office, misconduct, mismanagement, and incompetence.143 Although 
the constitution expressly provides only for collective responsibility, 
over time, parliament developed a practice of debating "motions of 
no confidence" against individual ministers.144 This practice, however, 
ended in 1997 upon the passage of a government-sponsored motion 
to end it.145 The government rightly argued that considerable time 
was wasted in debating motions of no confidence against ministers. 
Debates over these motions proved futile, because even when such 
motions passed they were unenforceable, as only the president has 
the "prerogative to appoint or dismiss" ministers. 146 This has not pre-
vented the parliament from censuring individual members of the 
cabinet.147 The principle of collective responsibility, however, gener-
ally causes the government to rally to the defense of any minister, 
even if clearly incompetent or unpopular. 
The parliament's most potent weapon against the government is 
the power to oust it through a vote of no confidence. As provided for 
by section 92 of the constitution: 
If the National Assembly at any time passes a resolution sup-
ported by a majority of all the Members of the Assembly who 
141 SeeBoTS. CONST. § 50(1). 
142 [d. 
143 See id. For criticisms of this, see NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 90-91. 
144 See BOTS. CONST. § 50(1); see also NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 91 (discussing the 
purpose of motions of no confidence). 
145 NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 91. The motion read: "That this Honourable House re-
solve in accordance with the provisions of section 76(1) of the Constitution of Botswana to 
prohibit with immediate effect the tabling of motions relating to ministers and indi\i.dual 
Members except as specified in the Standing Orders." [d. 
146 BOTS. CONST. § 43(c); NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 91. 
147 NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 91. 
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are entitled to vote declaring that it has no confidence in the 
Government of Botswana, Parliament shall stand dissolved 
on the fourth day following the day on which such resolution 
was passed, unless the President earlier resigns his office or 
dissolves Parliament.148 
This provision, however, operates as a double-edged sword. A vote of 
no confidence not only leads to the automatic removal of the presi-
dent, but also to the automatic dissolution of parliament and the 
holding of general elections within sixty days.149 Practically, section 92 
makes dissolution difficult by jeopardizing political stability. Thus, the 
likelihood of passing a vote of no confidence is extremely remote, not 
only because of the comfortable majority that the ruling BDP party 
has had in every parliamentary election since independence, but also 
because the opposition parties are weak and deeply divided.150 
In spite of these impediments to legislative power, BDP back-
benchers have on occasion pressured the government, leading to the 
introduction of several significant laws, and even compelling the gov-
ernment to withdraw some bills by threatening a backbench revolt. 151 
Other, more common means that the Botswana parliament uses to 
hold the executive branch accountable are through parliamentary 
processes like question time, during which any private member of par-
liament may question a minister as to statements made on public mat-
ters, motions, or the use of standing committees, sessional select 
committees, or commissions of inquiry.152 Although numerous other 
\48 BOTS. CONST. § 92. 
\49Id. §§ 90(3), 92. 
150 In the November 2004 elections, the opposition parties only captured thirteen of 
the fifty-seven elected seats, leaving the ruling BDP with an absolute m;Jjority of forty-eight 
seats (including the four specially appointed members). INDEP. ELECTORAL COMM'N, RE-
PORT TO THE MINISTER OF PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ON THE 
2004 GENERAL ELECTIONS 27 (2004). For a full discussion of the intricacies of the BDP's 
political control and the weaknesses of the opposition parties, see generally Brian T. 
Mokopakgosi & Mpho G. Molomo, Democracy in the Face of a Weak Opposition in Botswana, 14 
PULA: BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 3 (2000); see also M.G. Molomo, Political Parties and Democratic 
Governance ill Botswana, in AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: EVOLUTION, INSTITUTIONALISM, 
AND GOVERNANCE 293-318 (M.A. Mohamed Salih ed., 2003). 
151 For a full discussion of this concept, see generally Fombad, supra note 123. It is 
highly unlikely that the backbench would revolt in a way that would threaten the govern-
ment's m;Jjority in parliament. Nevertheless, the government would not want to appear 
arrogant or to be using its dominant position to force through measures its own back-
benchers are unhappy with. 
152 See genemlly Standing Orders of the National Assembly of Botswana (Standing Or-
ders) 26-31,33-40,90-94. 
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measures exist, however, they fail to ensure a fully accountable gov-
ernment. 
B. The Independence of the Judicial Power 
The judicial branch is normally charged with the enforcement of 
the constitution and other laws, and to ensure that the other two 
branches act in accordance with them. 153 The ability of the courts to 
do this is by no means automatic, but instead is heavily contingent 
upon the judiciary's independence. As in Britain, the relative inde-
pendence of the judiciary from both the executive and the legislature 
marks the extent to which the doctrine of separation of powers oper-
ates in Botswana. The only remarkable departure from this is the posi-
tion of the Attorney General, who, in his or her capacity as an ad hoc 
member of parliament,154 assists in presenting bills to parliament and 
addresses any legal questions raised. 155 He is also part of the execu-
tive, as he occupies a "public office" and acts as "the principal legal 
adviser to the Government. "156 Although not strictly a member of the 
cabinet as defined in section 44 of the constitution, he may be invited 
to participate in cabinet discussions if his legal expertise is required. 
The duties vested in him by the constitution to institute and under-
take legal proceedings on behalf of the state, and thus to enforce the 
criminal law are executive, rather than judicial functions. These have, 
however, been referred to at times as quasi-judicial functions, because 
in discharging these functions, the Attorney General is expected to 
act as guardian of the general public interest and operate apart from 
any party political influence.157 In this way, therefore, the Attorney 
General belongs to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
the government. 
As discussed below, though the judiciary enjoys considerable inde-
pendence from the other two branches of government, it does not op-
erate in a vacuum. Judicial independence does not mean judicial isola-
tion. Hence, there are circumstances when the other two branches play 
a limited, but legitimate role in exercising functions usually attributed 
to the judiciary, as part of the checks and balances inherent to the 
separation of powers. 
153 BOTS. CON ST. §§ 105, 106. 
154 Seeid. § 51(3). 
155 See Standing Order 60(2). 
156 See BOTS. CON ST. § 50(1), (2). 
157 See MORGAN, supra note 15, at 163-164, 267. 
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1. The Extent of Judicial Independence 
Two barometers typically measure the judiciary'S independence: 
personal independence and functional independence. The personal-
sometimes referred to as the relational-independence of the judiciary 
is reflected by factors such as the nature of judicial appointments and 
the terms and conditions of service. 
To the extent that the government appoints all the members of 
the Botswana judiciary to their positions, the executive controls the 
judiciary.158 According to the Magistrates' Court Act of 1983, the 
president, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission, may appoint qualified persons to any of the five grades 
of magistrates provided for under that ACt.159 The constitution also 
empowers the president alone to appoint the Chief Justice, who heads 
the High Court, but requires the president to consult with and obtain 
the advice of the Judicial Service Commission in appointing all other 
judges of the High Court.160 The same anomaly exists with respect to 
the Court of Appeal, where the president appoints the judges in con-
sultation with the Judicial Service Commission, but alone appoints the 
president ofthat court. 161 It is certainly not satisfactory for a politician 
acting in isolation to appoint the heads of the country's two highest 
courts without the benefit of the Judicial Service Commission's ad-
vice, and with no constitutional criteria to counter the influence of a 
desire for political expediency. This provision exposes judges so ap-
pointed to political manipulation, therefore placing the independ-
ence of the judiciary at risk. 
Two factors work together, however, to limit these risks. First, there 
is a considerable degree of security of tenure. Judges of the High Court 
and Court of Appeal are appointed on permanent, pensionable terms, 
and hold office until they reach compulsory retirement at the age of 
seventy.162 Lower court judges are on contract and hold office until 
their contracts expire.163 Generally, a judge can only be removed from 
158 It is important, however, to point out that this discussion is limited to the Common 
Law Courts and therefore excludes Customary Courts, where the position is more compli-
cated. See generally Customary Courts Act, Cap. 04:05. 
159 Magistrates' Court Act, Cap. 04:04, § 8 (1983) (Bots.). 
160 BoTS. CONST. § 96(1). 
161 Seeid. § 100(1), (2). 
162 Seeid. §§ 97(1),100(5). 
163 Because of an absence of trained local personnel, however, most judges are expatri-
ates appointed on temporary contracts for two- or three-year terms. The possibility that 
their contracts might not be renewed has certainly influenced the work of some of these 
judges, especially when dealing with politically charged controversial constitutional mat-
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office for the "inability to perform the functions of his office (whether 
arising from infirmity of body or mind or from any other cause) or for 
misbehaviour," according to a fairly stringent procedure laid out in the 
constitution.164 The Magistrates' Court Act is silent with respect to the 
position of magistrates, but as civil servants, magistrates retire like other 
civil servants at the age of sixty. 165 They are removable by the president 
acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, usually follow-
ing a series of disciplinary hearings. 166 
The second factor that may explain the relatively high degree of 
judicial independence in Botswana is their financial independence. 
The salaries of judges, the Attorney General, and members of the Ju-
dicial Service Commission are charged to the Consolidated Fllnd,167 
which permanently authorizes their compensation and prohibits the 
government from reducing it arbitrarily to pressure or influence 
them.168 Although the government appoints the Attorney General, 
the independence of the office is guaranteed constitutionally by sec-
tion 51 (7), which provides that in discharging judicial functions, the 
Attorney General "shall not be subject to the direction or control of 
any person or authority. "169 Thus, the Attorney General, although part 
of the executive and the legislature, is independen t of each. 
Functionally, judges in Botswana are shielded from threats, inter-
ference, or manipulation intended to compel them to favor unjustly a 
party or the state in legal proceedings. Various acts of parliament bol-
ters. In fact, these constitutional provisions providing for permanent tenured positions 
have hardly been strictly enforced. Sec generally BOJOSI OTLHOGILE, A HISTORY OF THE 
HIGHER COURTS OF BOTSWANA 1912-1990 vii (1991); Charles Manga Fombad, Protecting 
Constitutional Tillites in Africa: A Comparison of Botswana and Camerooll, 36 CaMP. INT'L LJ. S. 
AFR. 83, 92 (2003); AJ.G.M. Sanders, Constitutionalism in Botswana: A l'aliant A.ttempt at 
judicialActivism, 16 CaMP. INT'L LJ. S. AFR. 350 (1983). 
164 Sec BaTS. CaNST. §§ 97(2), (3) (High Court judges) , 101 (2), (3) (Court of Appeal 
judges). 
165 See Public SerYice Act § 15(2) (a) (Act No. 13 of 1998) (1998) (Bots.). As in Eng-
land, judges-appointed to superior courts of record-are distinguished from magis-
trates-appointed to the inferior magistrates' courts. \\'hile judges must have a law degree 
and ten years of experience in practice, magistrates may be appointed from the rank of 
court officials ",i.thout a law degree. Botswana's system thus departs from the English sys-
tem by allowing experienced senior magistrates "i.th law degrees to be appointed judges, 
creating a sort of career judiciary. 
166 See BaTS. CaNST. § 96(3). 
167 The constitution creates a Consolidated Fund, into which all revenues or other 
funds raised or received on behalf of Botswana's government must be paid. /d. § 117; 
NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 330. 
168 Sec BaTs. CaNST. § 122(5). 
169/d.§51. 
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ster their independence, boldness, and firmness in deciding cases by 
granting them immunity from civil and criminal proceedings.170 They 
are protected against unwarranted external pressure by the offense of 
contempt of court, enabling them to cite offenders for contempt and 
commit to prison anybody who attempts to denigrate or flout their 
decisions. 
2. Instances of Limited Mixing of Functions Between the Judiciary 
and the Executive 
Although the Botswana judiciary acts relatively independently, a 
number of situations occur in which the executive and the judiciary 
exercise each other's functions. The scope for this overlapping ap-
pears fairly well defined. 
The executive exercises limited judicial functions in two main 
ways. The first is the exercise of the presidential "prerogative of 
mercy. "171 These powers enable the president to: 
(a) grant to any person convicted of any offense a pardon, 
either free or subject to lawful conditions; 
(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a 
specified period, of the execution of any punishment im-
posed on that person for any offence; 
(c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for any pun-
ishment imposed on any person for any offense; and 
(d) remit the whole or part of any punishment imposed on 
any person for any offense or of any penalty or forfeiture oth-
erwise due to the Government on account of any offense.172 
In exercising these powers the president generally has the discre-
tion to consult the advisory committee on the prerogative of mercy. 
However, when any person has been sentenced to death, the presi-
dent must order the advisory committee to consider a report of the 
170 See, e.g., Customary Courts Act, § 46 (granting indemnity to officers acting judicially 
for official acts done in good faith and while executing warrants and orders); High Court 
Act, Cap. 04:02, § 25(1) (Bots.) (stating that a judge shall not be sued in any court for any 
act done by him or ordered done by him); BOTS. PENAL CODE § 14 (1986) (stating that a 
judicial officer is not criminally responsible for anything done or omitted in good faith in 
the exercise of his judicial functions). 
171 See BOTS. CON ST. §§ 53-55. According to the constitution, the president has the 
power to pardon convicted criminals with or without condition, alter their sentences, or 
commute them altogether. See id.; NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 86-87. 
172 BoTS. CON ST. § 53. 
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case on the prerogative of mercy, and can only exercise his powers of 
mercy after obtaining their advice.173 The president is not, however, 
obliged to follow the Committee's advice. Should the president de-
cline to exercise the prerogative, the president personally must sign 
the death warrant ordering the execution}74 The exercise of the pre-
rogative of mercy constitutes a serious interference with the judicial 
process, and is exercised only for good cause. Although the current 
president has exercised this prerogative often in decisions imposing 
prison sentences, he has generally been reluctant to intervene when 
the Court of Appeal has confirmed a death sentence. The practice so 
far suggests that only the most exceptional and unusual situation will 
cause the president to exercise his prerogative with respect to a death 
penalty passed by any of the superior courts.175 
The second area in which the executive exercises some judicial 
functions is in the regular creation of administrative tribunals and 
other disciplinary bodies, and conferring on them the right to deter-
mine matters that traditionally come within the jurisdiction of courts 
oflaw.176 In fact, many disputes arising within the public service today 
are not decided by litigation in the ordinary courts, but are decided 
by administrative bodies operating within the executive. For example, 
the Public Service Commission may undertake disciplinary proceed-
ings and impose sanctions against public servants. 177 The courts have, 
however, repeatedly stressed their inherent or common law right to 
review the proceedings and decisions taken by these administrative 
bodies and tribunals, to ensure that they do not exceed the powers 
173 See id. §§ 54-55. 
174 ScePrisons Act, Cap. 21:03, § 117 (1980) (Bots.). Even after signing the death war-
rant, a convict may still apply to the president for mercy. Ditshwanelo & Others v. Attorney-
Gen. & Another, [1999] 2 B.L.R. 59, 71. In DitshlOallelo, the High Court granted a stay of 
execution even after the president had signed the death warrant. Jd.; see NSEREKO, supra 
note 118, at 86-87. 
175 For example, in 2001, President Festus Mogae resisted enormous international 
pressure to grant clemency to a white South Mrican citizen, Mariette Bosch, whose death 
sentence for murdering her best friend had been confirmed by the Court of Appeal. 
Gideon Nkala, Bosch Haunts OP, MMEGI (Gaborone, Bots.), Apr. 12-19, 2001, at B1. Her 
application for clemency was rejected in a controversial manner, most likely to forestall 
further pressure; she was executed shortly afterwards. Address Erosion of Democratic Prillci-
ples-Mpho, DAILY NEWS ONLINE (Bots.), July 19, 2001, at http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/ 
news.cgi?d=20010719; BBC Broadcasts Film-Featurillg Bosch, DAILY NEWS ONLINE (Bots.), 
July 19, 2001, athttp://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20010719. 
176 The bodies are either created directly by parliament or by the executive, acting un-
der powers conferred on it under an act of parliamen t. 
177 See BOTS. CONST. §§ 110-111; Public Service Act §§ 24-32. 
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conferred on them, and that they conform to the ordinary rules of 
natural justice.178 
Because these broad executive powers exist, judicial control over 
the executive is now one of the most crucial features of any modern 
constitutional democracy. In Botswana, judicial control over executive 
action is exercised regularly to protect citizens against the unlawful 
acts of government officials or departments by ensuring that they per-
form their statutory duties and that in doing so they do not exceed 
their powers. In exercising this control, the Botswana courts have on 
several occasions nullified governmental acts that they considered to 
be unlawful.179 
As regards the judiciary exercising executive functions, judges 
and other members of the judiciary have at times been appointed to 
discharge nonjudicial functions falling within the executive domain. 
These appointments may be of a temporary or permanent nature, but 
both manifest in various ways and may provoke a range of problems. 
One permanent appointment provided for by the constitution 
itself is section 38(1), which makes the Chief Justice the returning 
officer for purposes of presidential elections.1so This provision gives 
the Chief Justice the right not only to determine questions that arise 
regarding compliance with the constitution or laws relating to the 
election of the president under sections 32 and 35, but also the valid-
ity of the election of any person as president. I81 Section 38(2) states 
that the Chief justice's "decision shall not be questioned in any 
court," but the High Court maintains its inherent power to review and 
quash any decision, if procedural irregularities were present or the 
Chief Justice acted ultra vires.I82 
178 See, e.g., Crown Paints v. Botswana Hous. Corp. & Others, [1999] 2 B.L.R. 78, 81 
(reviewing housing corporation's procedure for tendering supply and delivery of painting 
materials contracts); Nyoni v. Chairman, Air Botswana Disciplinary Comm. & Another, 
[1999] 2 B.L.R. 15, 24 (reviewing a disciplinary committee's decision); Students' Repre-
sentative Council v. Univ. of Botswana & Others, [1989] B.L.R. 396; Mosebola v. Attorney-
Gen., [1988] B.L.R. 159. For further discussion of the government's sensitivity over this 
issue, see Sello Motseta, Botswana's Democracy Losing Its Shine, MMEGI (Gaborone, Bots.), 
June 28, 2001, at 40. 
179 See, e.g., Molapisi v. Attorney-Gen. & Another, [1999] 1 B.L.R. 519, 522-27; Mbisana 
v. Attorney-Gen. & Another, [1999] 1 B.L.R. 189,200-02. 
180 BoTS. CON ST. § 38 (1). 
181 ld. §§ 32, 35, 38. 
182 ld. § 38(2). Another example is the appointment of the Chief Justice, under section 
103 of the constitution, to serve as the chairman of the Judicial Service Commission. ld. 
§ 103. 
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More often, however, judges and other members of the judiciary 
are appointed to preside over ad hoc commissions of inquiry, or over 
bodies or groups reporting on policy issues. A recent and controversial 
example was the appointment ofa retired South Mricanjudge in 2001, 
to head what became known as the Khumalo Presidential Commission. 
The Commission investigated certain failings in the preparation of the 
2001 referendum to amend certain provisions of the constitution.183 
The final report held the Attorney General responsible for some of the 
mistakes made.184 For several months, there were reports of plans by 
the Attorney General to sue the president and government, allegedly to 
clear his name and reputation based on his absence at the Commis-
sion's hearings and lack oflegal representation. 185 
Selection of members of the judiciary to perform some of these 
executive functions, such as the Chief Justice, reflects an intuitive de-
sire to seek persons whose independence and impartiality in handling 
matters of public concern is recognized and accepted widely. Never-
theless, as is evidenced by these examples, the nonjudicial responsi-
bilities given to judges, especially those relating to investigatory tasks 
or controversial policies, may imperil the reputation and prestige of 
the judiciary.186 Judges risk public identification with the policies of 
the group or body concerned in the investigation, or they may be put 
in a position of being seen as either critics or supporters of the gov-
ernment. There is also the risk that some judges' performance of 
these duties may be influenced by the expectation of elevation to a 
higher judicial office. In addition, the absence of a judge from regular 
183 See Government Notice No. 404 (2001). 
184 [d. Among other tasks, the Commission was required to "identify, by name, the per-
son or persons who are culpable or share in the culpability of the acts, errors or omis-
sions," leading to the postponement of the referendum and the amendment of the writ of 
the referendum. [d. 
185 Subsequent newspaper accounts reported that an out-of-court settlement had been 
reached between the Attorney General and the office of the president. See generally Open 
Letter to Phandu Skelemani, MMEGI (Gaborone, Bots.), Jan. 25-31, 2002, at 2l. This is not 
surprising, for in Kwclagobe & A.nother v. Kgabo & Jl.nothcr, the court held that by failing to 
inform the applicants that their conduct was under investigation, a commission of inquiry 
failed to observe the rules of natural justice and thus its proceedings were null and void. 
[1994] B.L.R. 129. 
Another notable example was the Presidential Commission on the Judiciary of 1997, 
headed by the late Chief Justice Aguda. See REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE JUDICIARY (1998). In the vVhite Paper following the 
Commission report's publication, the government accepted some recommendations but 
rejected others. See Constitutional Changes Prompt Referendum, Says 1'v1ogmlli, DAILY NEWS 
ONLINE (Bots.),July 12, 2001, athttp://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20010712. 
186 See VANDERBILT, supra note 9, at 118-119. 
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duties in Botswana, a nation grappling with a shortage of competent 
judicial personnel, inevitably increases the workload of other judges 
and may encumber the disposition of cases. IS7 
Moreover, such appointments could lead to confusion between 
the judicial and executive functions. For example, it is one thing for 
the constitution to name the Chief Justice as the returning officer for 
presidential elections, and quite another to grant him the sole author-
ity to determine the validity of the president's election. On what basis 
should this determination be made: on the Justice's judgment as a 
returning officer, an executive position, or as a Chief Justice, a judicial 
position? Further, the fact that the president alone appoints the Chief 
Justice, without the obligation to consult anybody or follow objectively 
defined criteria must not be forgotten. 
As the Khumalo Presidential Commission Report shows, non-
judicial activities often produce and provoke dissension or criticism 
that threaten to undermine the prestige and respect of the judges in-
volved, or even the judiciary as a whole. The controversy generated by 
the Khumalo Report certainly has not enhanced the reputation of 
Justice Khumalo, an otherwise well-respected judge. Because he was 
already retired and from a foreign jurisdiction, however, the damage 
was not as serious as it would have been if the criticism had been di-
rected against an active judge. Upon resuming his or her regular du-
ties, a judge who serves on a commission may feel compelled to adopt 
a position that justifies or defends the position taken while serving on 
the commission, regardless of its merits. 
Be that as it may, judges and other members of the judiciary will 
continue to be appointed to discharge nonjudicial functions, espe-
cially when these functions require some degree of legal expertise. To 
the extent that this occurs, it is desirable to use only retired judges or 
limit the participation of active judges to non-controversial policy 
matters, where there is little chance of endangering their reputation 
for independence and impartiality. 
Judges also may perform executive functions in the review of the 
exercise of discretion by an administrative body. As noted above, the 
courts stress their common law right to review these proceedings and 
decisions. Courts intervene even when the statute establishing a par-
ticular tribunal or body purports to grant it exclusive jurisdiction, and 
states that its decisions are final and not subject to appeal or review by 
187 SeeOTLHOGILE, supra note 163, at 89, 98-102,126-27. 
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the courts. Thus, in Tafic Sporting Club v. Mokobi N.D. & Anothel;188 
even though section 17 (2) of the Botswana National Sports Council 
Act stated that the National Sports Council Appeals Board's decisions 
would be final, the Act did not deprive the court of its inherent pow-
ers to quash the board's decision, if the decision was ultra vires or er-
roneous. Typically, however, the courts do not exercise discretion that 
has been reserved exclusively for these administrative bodies.189 
The general principle reiterated in Arbi v. Commissioner of Prisons 
& Another is that where the legislature has conferred discretion upon 
an administrative body, the courts would not attempt to substitute it 
with their own.l90 Nevertheless, exceptions exist where the courts, in 
an action for judicial review, may substitute their own decisions for 
that of an administrative body and indirectly perform functions re-
served by the legislature for that body.191 These situations are: 
(a) where the end result is in any event a foregone conclu-
sion and it would merely be a waste of time to order the ad-
ministrative tribunal or authority to reconsider the matter; 
(b) where further delay would cause unjustifiable prejudice 
to the applicant; 
(c) where the administrative tribunal or authority has ex-
hibited bias or incompetence to such a degree that it would 
be unfair to require the applicant to submit to the same ju-
risdiction again; and 
(d) where the court is in as good a position to make the de-
cision itself.192 
In Arbi, the Minister of Labour and Home Affairs rejected an ap-
plication for remission under section 53(d) of the constitution.l93 
188 [1997] B.L.R. 177. 
189 See Gogannekgosi v. Comm'r for Workmen's Compensation & Others, [1993] 
B.L.R. 360, 361-62 (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a claim to overturn a decision made 
on behalf of the minister under the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act); Attorney-Gen. & An-
other v. Kgalagadi Res. Dev. Co. (Pty.) Ltd., [1995] B.L.R. 234, 240 (stating that the proper 
approach to a proceeding invoh'ing the review of a Central Tender Board decision is to 
consider whether the allegations and remedy sought are within the general scope of "re-
viewable acts by pu blic bodies"). 
190 See generally [1992] B.L.R. 246. 
191 See id. at 255. 
192 See id.; NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 312. 
193 [1992] B.L.R. at 255-56. The Court of Appeal granted the appellants' request and 
set aside the decision of the responsible officers, after concluding that "another day's delay 
in the administrati\'e process would ... result in unwarranted incarceration of the appel-
lant and [cause] severe prejudice." Id. 
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Clearly, the courts do sometimes exercise some administrative func-
tions, though they will not do so unless a firm legal basis allows such 
action. 
3. Instances of Limited Mixing of Functions Between the Judiciary 
and the Legislature 
In certain situations, the judiciary or legislature may exercise 
some control over each other, or even exercise each other's functions. 
The legislature generally controls the judiciary by its ability to make 
legislation that regulates the judiciary. Nevertheless, as seen earlier, 
unlike other public servants in Botswana, the provision for payment 
of judges' salaries from the Consolidated Fund denies parliament an 
annual opportunity to discuss and criticize the activities of judges.194 
Judicial salaries can still, however be changed. In a period of rapid 
inflation such as that existing today, the purpose of this principle is 
not so much to guard against reductions in salaries, but rather to pro-
vide a mechanism by which salaries of judges can be increased at a 
pace commensurate to that of other public servants.195 Therefore, 
salaries can be increased, but not reduced. Income tax is levied 
against a judge's salary in the same way as on the salaries of other 
members of the community, provided that doing so does not dis-
criminate against judges. These principles attempt to insulate judges 
from parliamentary pressure, and are reinforced by a convention that 
protects judges from disparaging criticism in parliament. This does 
not mean that members of parliament, like ordinary citizens, should 
not criticize judges, but rather requires such criticisms to be fair and 
reasonable, and not made maliciously or in a way that brings unwar-
ranted disrepute on the courts.196 
194 As Alexander Hamilton explained, "In the general course of human nature, a 
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, 
supra note 22, at 531 (Alexander Hamilton). 
195 OYer the last few years, inflation has been fairly steady at around 7.5%, but in 2003, 
it rose to 9.7%, causing the government to increase salaries by ten to twenty-five percent. 
Last year, however, inflation dropped to 6.7%. Un surprisingly, the Minister of Finance and 
Development Planning made no mentiou of further salary increases in the 2005-2006 
budget presented to parliament in February. Modest Swplus for '05/'06, DAILY NEWS ON-
LINE (Bots.), Feb. 8, 2005, available at http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=2005 
0208; BANK OF BOTS., 2 BOTSWANA FINANCIAL STATISTICS 8 (Sept. 2004). 
196 See In re Editor of Botswana Gazette & Another, [1990] B.L.R. 655, 657 (noting that 
newspapers have published articles criticizing Botswana courts, which they have a right to 
do, but they should be "fair and reasonable"). 
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Regarding the control exercised by the courts over the legisla-
ture, Botswana differs from Britain, where the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy denies the courts the power to review the validity of legisla-
tion. Although the constitution vests in parliament the "power to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government of Botswana,"197 
this does not include the power to make laws that contravene the con-
stitution itself. As Justice LA. Maisels said in Desai & Another v. State: 
[T] he National Assembly is supreme only in the exercise of 
its legislative powers and these powers cannot override the 
rights and freedom of its citizens or other persons ... which 
are entrenched in the Constitution.198 
Thus, the courts have not hesitated to invalidate parliamentary en-
actments or subsidiary legislation inconsistent with the constitution. 
For example, in Petms & Another v. State,199 the Court of Appeal de-
clared section 301 (3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
void on the grounds that it infringed section 7 (l) of the constitution, 
prohibiting torture, inhuman, or degrading punishment.20o Again, in 
Attorney-General v. DOW,201 the court also declared section 4 (1) of the 
Citizenship Act void for violating the constitutional prohibition of dis-
crimination in sections 3 and 15, because it denied citizenship to the 
offspring of Batswana202 women married to foreigners, but granted 
citizenship to the offspring of Batswana men married to foreigners. 
A third example, this time of subsidiary legislation, is the case of 
Students' Representative Council of Molepolole College of Education v. AttoT-
ney-General.203 The Court of Appeal held that a college regulation, 
which required pregnant women to leave the college for at least one 
year, was contrary to section 15 of the constitution and therefore 
void. 204 In fact, section 105 of the constitution vests exclusive jurisdic-
tion on the High Court and Court of Appeal to entertain any matter 
197 Sec BOTS. CON ST. § 86. 
19S [1987] B.L.R. 55, 62. 
199 [1984] B.L.R. 14, 18-19,31. 
200 This section prO\ided for corporal punishment in the form of strokes to be admin-
istered in the traditional manner using traditional instruments. Act No. 21 of 1982 
(amending the Criminal Procedure and Eyidence Act, Cap. 08:02, § 301(3) (1982) 
(Bots.)) . 
201 [1992] B.L.R. 119, 127, 160. 
202 One citizen of Botswana is referred to as a Motswana, while multiple citizens are re-
ferred to as Batswana. 
203 [1995] B.L.R. 178, 195-96. 
204 Id. at 196. 
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involving constitutional interpretation.205 But although this gives these 
courts the power to review all legislation and quash any that infringe 
any constitutional provisions, it does not give them power to nullify 
sections of the constitution itself.206 Thus, the High Court in the re-
cent case of Karnanakao & Another v. Attorney-Generai,207 while express-
ing sympathy with the plaintiffs' case that sections 77, 78, and 79 of 
the constitution discriminated against certain tribes in the country, 
noted that it had no powers to order their amendment.208 
In Botswana, the judiciary exercises traditionally legislative func-
tions at times in two principal ways. The first-and probably the more 
common way-is through the doctrine of binding precedent, which 
came to Botswana as a part of the general adoption of English law 
during the colonial era.209 The judicial function of legal interpreta-
tion and application has a quasi-legislative effect, creating precedents 
that must be followed in subsequent cases with similar facts. This pro-
cess of 'Judicial legislation" in both common law and statutory inter-
pretation contributes to legal development.210 In England and the 
United States, besides the enduring impact of the doctrine of binding 
precedent, judge-made law has often intervened in areas where the 
205 BOTS. CONST. §§ 105,106. 
206 See id. 
207 No. 377 of 1999 (Misc. App. Nov. 23, 2001) (Bots.). 
208 However, in recognition of this problem, on July 28, 2000, the government ap-
pointed a presidential commission to inquire into these sections and, among other goals, 
to "seek a construction that would eliminate any interpretation that renders the sections 
discriminatory." See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO SECTIONS 
77,78 AND 79 OF THE CONSTITUTION QF' BOTSWANA 9 (2001). The Commission submitted 
its report in 2001, and in 2002, the government published a White Paper accepting some 
of the Commission's recommendations. See generally Charles Manga Fombad, The Constitu-
tional Protection Against Discrimination in Botswana, 53 INT'L & CaMP. L.Q. 139-70 (2004). It 
should be noted that section 89 of the constitution provides a special procedure for 
amending the constitution. BaTS. CaNST. § 89. 
209 See generally Justice Akinola Aguda, Legal Developments i1l Botswana from 1885 to 1966, 
5 BaTS. NOTES & RECS 52-63 (1973);J.R. Crawford, The History and Nature of the Judicial 
System of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland-Introduction and the Superior Courts (pts. I, 2), 86 
S. AFR. LJ. 476 (1969), 87 S. AFR. LJ. 76 (1970); Bankie Forster, Introduction to the History of 
the Administration of Justice of tlte Republic of Botswana, 13 BaTS. NOTES & RECS. 89-100 
(1981). 
210 As Lord Wilberforce stated in British Railways Board v. Herrington, "[T]he common 
law is a developing entity as the judges develop it, and so long as we follow the well tried 
method of moving forward in accordance with principle as fresh facts emerge and changes 
in society occur, we are surely doing what Parliament intends we should do." [1972] 1 All 
E.R. 749, 778. 
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government has been unwilling to ask for legislation or has been too 
slow to propose new measures.211 This is also true in Botswana.212 
The second setting in which the judiciary performs legislative 
functions arises when parliament expressly authorizes the judiciary to 
legislate on certain matters. The best example of this appears in sec-
tion 95 (6) of the constitution, which states that "the Chief Justice may 
make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of the High 
Court in relation to the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it. "213 
On this basis, section 28 of the High Court Act provides the Chief Jus-
tice with wide-ranging powers to make rules as he deems necessary or 
desirable to facilitate the proper dispatch and conduct of the business 
of the High Court. 214 
The obvious advantage of this system is that, as legal experts, 
judges are better situated to understand the specific procedural prob-
lems needing resolution and the various ways to do so. It also expe-
dites amendments of rules as needed, without requiring the complex 
and protracted legislative amendment process. Perhaps the greatest 
advantage of judicial rule-making here is the reinforcement of judicial 
independence. Even though made by judges, these rules of court, like 
all other forms of subsidiary legislation, must nevertheless fall within 
the powers conferred on them by the enabling legislation. Thus, in 
Ngope v. O'B,ien Qyiinn, the Court of Appeal declared a rule made by 
the Chief Justice, acting under section 28 of the High Court Act, as 
ultra vires and therefore invalid.215 
The exercise of judicial functions by the legislature, in contrast, 
has been limited because of the general desire of parliament to respect 
and preserve the prestige and independence of the judiciary. Neverthe-
211 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding state-sanctioned segregation of public schools to be 
unconstitutional); Brind & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1991] 1 All E.R. 
720, 725 (stating that the courts cannot undertake judicial review unless the Home Secre-
tary's decision was "irrational" or "perverse"); Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] 1 All E.R. 874 
(holding that, absent clear evidence that withholding information was in the public inter-
est, disclosure was required). 
212 For example, in Attomcy General v. Ullity DolV, the court invalidated discriminatory 
provision of the Citizenship Act of 1992. [1992] B.L.R. 119, 125, 160. The legislature, how-
ever, did not amend the Act until 1995. Citizenship Amendment Act (1995). 
213 BOTS. CON ST. § 95(6). 
214 High Court Act § 28. Similar powers have been conferred on the president of the 
Court of Appeal in section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act, with respect to proceedings be-
fore the Court of Appeal, although this is not expressly sanctioned by the constitution. 
Court of Appeal Act, Cap. 04:01, § 16 (1982) (Bots.). 
215 [1986] B.L.R. 335, aff'd [1987] B.L.R. 248. 
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less, the parliament can intervene and perform judicial functions in 
many ways and specific situations. The most common example of this is 
where some legal uncertainty or controversy over an issue arises. The 
parliament may intervene through an enactment that is declaratory or 
expository on the law. Such a declaratory statute is designed to resolve 
any doubts as to what the law is or is intended to be. 
For example, in State v. Ndleleni Dube,216 the High Court held that 
where the accused person provides police with material evidence as 
part of an inadmissible confession, that evidence is inadmissible against 
the accused person. Unhappy with this decision, parliament overrode it 
by passing the Criminal Procedure and Evidence (Amendment) Act of 
1983.217 Section 87(6) of the constitution, however, precludes parlia-
ment from enacting penal legislation with a retroactive effect, thus lim-
iting the scope of retroactive declaratory statutes.218 Absent this limita-
tion, citizens have no vested right in any particular legal remedy and 
hence, parliament may change remedies, alter the rules of evidence, 
and generally modifY the law as it sees fit and apply this to prior trans-
actions. 
The courts, however, retain the full right to interpret the law un-
der the constitution. A curative act of parliament-such as legislation 
designed to change the decision in a particular case, or confirm judi-
cial proceedings otherwise void for lack of jurisdiction-would consti-
tute undue encroachmen t on the judicial domain and be declared 
void by the courts.219 For similar reasons, parliament cannot declare 
by statute the intent of a former act, or prescribe a certain construc-
tion of a former act.220 Likewise, parliament cannot by a statutory en-
actment declare an act either constitutional or void, although it can 
repeal or refuse to enact any law because it deems it unconstitutional, 
regardless of whether the courts declare it constitutionaJ.221 On the 
whole, parliament's extensive powers are tempered by a strong desire 
to avoid public perception that it is usurping judicial functions in a 
manner that undermines the judiciary's independence. 
216 [1981] B.L.R. 175, 176; see NSEREKO, supra note 118, at 65 n.4. 
217 Criminal Procedure and Evidence (Amendment) Act (1983) (Bots.). 
218 In fact, section 10(4) of the constitution says that "no person shall be held to be 
guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it 
took place, constitute such an offence." BaTS. CaNST. § 10(4). 
219 See BONDY, supra note 9, at 89. 
22°Id. 
221Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
vVhat emerges from the preceding analysis is not only that the doc-
trine of separation of powers is a prominent feature of Botswana's con-
stitutional system, but also that this doctrine is not merely an abstract 
theoretical and philosophical construct. Instead, it is a practical, work-
able principle that is as relevant today as it was when first formulated 
centuries ago. The threat of tyranny is as potent today as it was when 
Lord Acton warned famously that "power tends to corrupt, and abso-
lute power corrupts absolutely. "222 The separation of power, whether in 
the American, British, or French sense, does not, as some critics sug-
gest, require a rigid separation of the different organs of power into 
watertight compartments, but rather sufficient separation to forestall 
the dangers that are inherent in the concentration of powers. 
The Botswana analysis demonstrates that the doctrine contains 
elements of universal validity that no country can afford to ignore in 
the arrangement of its governmental institutions. Although the doc-
trine of separation of powers. alone cannot explain Botswana's out-
standing and enviable record in Africa as a successful, liberal, multi-
party, constitutional democracy, its impact cannot be ignored. The 
executive, especially the Office of President, is as powerful as any in Af-
rica, but what sets Botswana apart from most other African govern-
ments is the considerable freedom with which the courts regularly re-
view and invalidate irregular and illegal executive and legislative acts. 
Individuals who feel that their constitutional rights have been infringed 
have regularly resorted to the courts. In a recent case,223 one party chal-
lenged the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, arguing that it was sub-
sumed under the executive arm of the state and thus in conflict with 
the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the constitution. This 
judicial freedom places Botswana in marked contrast to many Fran-
cophone African countries, who copied the French model of the sepa-
ration of powers, providing a much more limited vision of judicial in-
dependence.224 Consequently, those governments regularly suffer no 
consequences for violations of their constitutions.225 
222 VANDERBILT, supra note 9, at 37 (quoting JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG, LORD 
ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 335-36 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1972)). 
223 Direng v. Furniture Mart (Pty) Ltd., [1995) B.L.R. 826. The court held that the ar-
guments advanced to support the contention were misplaced, and that the mere appoint-
ment of judges by the executive did not compromise the independence of these judges. 
224 Scc gcncrally Fombad, supra note 97 (referencing other discussions of the situation in 
Francophone Africa). 
225 Scc gcncrally Fombad, supra note 163. 
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The simple fact that Botswana's constitution creates situations in 
which the same persons belong to more than one of the three organs 
of power, or that each of these organs to some extent control and exer-
cise the functions of the other, does not by necessity contradict the doc-
trine of separation of powers. The special cases where an organ per-
forms the functions of another, or interferes with the functions of the 
other are both explicit and implied by the nature of government itself. 
These special cases are determinable and limited; the doctrine would 
be meaningless if it could be circumvented completely and with impu-
nity. The doctrine, as an important touchstone of constitutional de-
mocracy, appears to do no more than provide that particular functions, 
for practical purposes, belong primarily to a given organ of power, 
while simultaneously superimposing a power of limited interference by 
another organ to ensure that the former does not exercise its acknowl-
edged functions in an arbitrary and despotic manner. In a modern age 
that stresses realism and political pragmatism rather than strict dogma, 
the doctrine of separation of powers facilitates unity, cohesion, and 
harmony within a system of checks and balances. It is clear that while 
the separation of powers on its own cannot guarantee constitutional 
democracy, where, as in Botswana, it exists and is allowed to work, it 
does so reasonably well and creates a more sustainable and feasible 
constitutional democracy. 
